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Overview

Since the 1970's, much research has been done in an
attempt to determine variables that cause decline of the
president's popularity.

Although there are different studies

that give various reasons for the decline of the president's
popularity, all agree that there is a trend of decline over
the president's term.

To represent the decline, James Stimson

suggested a parabola model, whereas John Mueller suggested a
linear-regression model.

This paper attempts to show that a

linear-regression

is

model

more

effective

in

explaining

decline of the presidents from Truman to Johnson, than from
Nixon to Bush.

The findings show that a linear model does

somewhat represent the era of Truman to Johnson better than
the era of Nixon to Bush.

Presidential Popularity and the Linear Model

Political scientists continue to search for independent
variables which affect presidential popularity.

One common

finding is a tendency for presidential popularity to decline
over the term.
research.

This topic has been the subject of much

There have been several hypotheses to explain the

decline of presidents' popularity.

Some of the hypotheses

included war, party cleavages, and economics.
studied the variables of economy,
John

events.

Mueller

war,

researched

the

George Edwards

issues,

and rally

possibility

of

a

multivariate hypothesis; variables that he believed affected
presidential popularity were time, national events, economy,
and war.

Samuel Kernell employed a marginal strategy which

predicted popularity associated with partisanship.

Richard

Brody

Johnson

and

Benjamin

Page

looked

only

at

the

administration and the Nixon administration and based the
rise and fall of presidential popularity on "good" news and
"bad" news.

Henry Kenski and Kristen Monroe analyzed the

effect of the economy on presidential popularity.
scholarly

studies

are

discussed

more

in

the

These

literature

review.
There is a general consensus that there are variables
which affect the ratings of the president,

but questions

regarding which variables and to what extent do the variables
affect the decline of the president causes a considerable
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disagreement.

one of the disagreements is whether or not the

ratings of the president can be represented by a
regression or by a parabola model.

linear

A linear regression model

suggests that the line will have a constant slope that will
decline; whereas, a parabola line suggests that the slope
will decline at different rates.

John Mueller studied the

decline of presidential popularity from Truman to Johnson and
contended that the "coalition-of-minorities"

is a

strong

variable affecting the decline of the president's popularity.
He found linear declines in popularity for almost all the
presidential terms he studied.

In a more recent study, James

Stimson, argued for a parabola model to explain the decline
of the president's popularity.

Stimson's model predicted

that the president's popularity will be at its highest when
he enters off ice.

The decline will continue into the second

half of the term then will rise slightly at the end of his
term but will never reach again the previous high point.
Stimson looked at popularity as being cyclical and a function
of time.

Stimson's and Mueller's research is discussed more

extensively in the following background section.
This thesis will review the literature pertaining to
presidential

popularity,

propose
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a

hypothesis,

test

the

hypothesis and analyze the results of the hypothesis.

The

contradiction between Stimson and Mueller is the focal issue.
The thesis will test the linear model on two time periods.
The predicted outcome is that the linear model is a better
predictor of the era from the Truman administration through
the Johnson administration than form the Nixon administration
through the Bush administration.

The reasoning behind the

prediction relies on the known tendency that, over the past
twenty years, the public's opinion has become more volatile.
The change of the American people over the past two decades
can be associated with their distrust of government, weak
ties to parties, and the impact of media on public opinion.

Background Information

The

background

information

overview of previous research.

gives

a

chronological

The start of the reviewed

research begins in 1970 with John Mueller, and ends with a
study by George Edwards in 1985.

Over the past twenty years

the studies have become advanced in manipulating data, with
studies sometimes building on one another.
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Each study varies

in the approach used to test for presidential decline and on
the proposed variables that attribute to this decline.
John Mueller,

from the University of Rochester,

examined the president's popularity from Truman to Johnson
(Mueller 1970) •
popularity,

Like most researchers of presidential

he used the Gallup

Poll's question

"Do you

approve or disapprove of the way (the incumbent) is handling
his job as President?"

Over time, the index has become the

longest and the most consistently asked question
history of polling.

in the

Mueller analyzed the polling results

from the Truman administration to the end of the Johnson
administration.

During this time, the popularity question

was asked 300 times.
Mueller used four variables to predict the president's
popularity.

The variables were: 1) the length of time the

incumbent has been in off ice, 2) the influence of ratings
because of major national events, 3) the influence of ratings
due to an economic slump, and 4) the impact of war on the
president's

ratings.

He

employed

a

multiple-regression

analysis and a basic analytic technique to control for the
independent impact of each variable.
The dependent variable, presidential popularity, was the
percentage approving the way the incumbent was handling his
5

job as president.

The average approval rating

for

the

presidents from Truman to Johnson was fifty-eight percent.
The Gallup Poll's question on presidential popularity pried
into the respondents' viewpoint on how the president was
handling

his

job.

The

question

did

not

relate

respondents opinion to a specific event or issue.
inquired

whether

or

not

the

respondent

the

It simply

approved

or

disapproved, and if no opinion was given, the opinion must be
volunteered by the respondent to be included in the results.
Mueller found that the president's popularity had varied
from Truman to Johnson.
president.

Harry Truman was the most popular

At one time,

eighty-five percent.

in 1945, his popularity reached

Also, he was the least popular--from

early 1951 until March 1952--with a ratings less than thirty
percent.

Lyndon Johnson closely approached Truman's highest

approval rating.

Eisenhower's rating topped off at seventy-

nine percent and did not drop below forty-nine percent.
Also, Kennedy had a very high approval rating which did not
drop much before his death.
The "coalition of minorities" variable explained that
even though a president always acts with majority support on
an issue, he can alienate a sizable amount of minorities. In
other words, a president will upset different minority groups
(women,

organized labor,

environmentalist,
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etc. , ) ,

but a

combined coalition of minorities equals a majority of people
that are displeased with the president for different reasons.
There were three reasons a coalition of minorities could
happen.
opponents

First, the president gradually created unforgiving
out

of

his

former

supporters.

Second,

the

president's actions could not please either side resulting in
a "minus sum" game.

Third, disillusionment occurs when the

president makes promises he cannot keep.

The occurrences of

these coalition of minorities predicted decline.
Mueller

opertionalized

the

coalition-of-minorities

variabler by using the length of time, in years, since the
incumbent was inaugurated (for first terms)
(for second terms).

Mueller calculated r

or re-elected

as -.47 and the

decline was to start over again for the second term because
the president should have rebuilt his coalition of minorities
into minority supporters.
of popularity.

Mueller assumed a linear decline

In other words, he hypothesized that the

president's decline would be at an even rate for his four
years of his term.
The "rally around the flag" variable expected that a
president's popularity will increase due to certain intense
international events.

Mueller stated that caution must be
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observed because one tended to find a sizable sudden increase
in support and then dart to the historical records to find an
intense international event.

This process can prove that the

variable is significant.
Mueller adopted a

different

strategy to

find

rally

points. "In general, a rally point must have associated with
an event which 1) is international and 2) involves the United
states and particularly the president directly; and it must
be 3}

specific,

dramatic,

and sharply focused."

(Mueller

1970)

When using this criteria, Mueller found thirty-four

rally points that fall into the following categories:
military
ongoing

intervention;
wars;

major

major

military

diplomatic

technological developments;

sudden

developments

developments;

in

major

presidential conferences with a

country's head; and the start of the president's term.
Mueller

operationalized

the

rally-around-the-flag

variable by calculating the length of time, in years, since
the last rally point.

The simple r was -.11 and the variable

is

This variable was used to test the

in linear form.

hypothesis that although a president popularity declines over
time, the spurt in the line can be explained by the rallyaround-the-flag variable.
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The third variable examined by Mueller was the "economic
slump."

He used the unemployment rate

indicator.

as the

Mueller recommended this indicator because of its

availability by each month and because it had a
indicator

economic

of

health.

The

economic

variable

general
was

the

unemployment rate at the time of inauguration subtracted from
the rate at the time of the poll.

During Eisenhower's term,

unemployment reached some of its highest points.
added a

Mueller

dummy variable to explain this phenomenon.

The

variable included the general taking care of the unemployed.
Due

to

a

correlation

of

.77

between

the

correlation

coefficient and the regression coefficient for the economic
variable, an adjustment was made.

Mueller set the economic

variable equal to zero, whenever the unemployment rate was
lower at the time of the survey than it had been at the start
of the incumbent's present term.

It assumed "Bust is bad for

him, but boom is not particularly good."
The

fourth

variable was war.

(Mueller 1970)

During the

study of

presidential popularity, Truman's and Johnson's ratings were
greatly effected by the Korean conflict and the Vietnam War.
Mueller

found

that

the

correlation

between

popularity and the war variable was -.66.

presidential

However, Mueller

recognized a problem in the analysis - the fact that Truman
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and

Johnson's

started.

popularity was

declining

before

the

wars

Also, they both had a sizable decline in their

first terms without the dilemma of war.

To see how the wars

effected the already declining popularity was to use another
dummy variable, a variable that took on a value of one when
a war was on and remained zero otherwise.
To find the results, Mueller presented six equations.
All the equations were presented in chart form, but not all
of the equations were discussed.

Each equation assessed the

four variables and their association with the popularity of
the president.

Mueller discussed the war variable on its

own.
Equation
rating

one

started

at

suggested that
sixty-nine

percentage points per year.
variable

had

a

significant

the

percent

average
and

popularity

declined

six

The coalition-of-minorities
negative

relationship.

The

coefficients of the rally around the flag variable and the
economic slump variable moved in the right direction but
failed to be statistically significant.
Equation two added a dummy variable for all of the
presidents.

This equation suggested that all the presidents

would decline or increase at the same rate and allowed for
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each President to start at its own level of popularity.

The

rally-around-the-flag and the economic slump variables moved
greater to the predicted direction.

However,

the rally-

around-the-f lag variable did not quite attain statistical
significance.
Equation three allowed for each president's popularity
to start at different levels and increase at their own rate.
President Truman's ratings fell eleven to twelve percentage
points per year.

Johnson's popularity ratings fell around

nine percentage points per year.

Kennedy ratings per year

could

of

not

be

assessed

because

his

untimely

death.

Equation three portrayed Eisenhower's approval ratings as not
declining at all.

On the contrary, Eisenhower achieved a

statistically significant increase of popularity of two and
a half percentage points per year.
The

rally

around

the

flag

variable

statistically significant in equations 3,

proved
4,

5,

to

be

and 6.

Mueller described that the rally around the flag variable
acts as a parasite.

This variable can explain the bumps and

wiggles on the pattern for other variables.

However, on its

own the rally around the flag variable cannot explain all of
the declines in presidential popularity.
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The economic slump variable weakened in equation 3, 4,
5, and 6 .

This variable "suggests a decline of popularity of

about three percentage points for every percentage point rise
in the unemployment rate over the level holding when the
President

began his present

term."

(Mueller

1970)

The

economic slump variable tended to be limited because of the
small (three to seven percentage points) of the unemployment
rate.
The war variable assessed the impact on Presidential
popularity of the wars in Korea and Vietnam.

Truman's and

Johnson's popularity was in decline in their first terms and
in clear decline in their second terms before the start of
the wars;
6.

therefore, the dummy variable was used in equation

Equation

6

implied that the

presence

of war would

decrease the popularity ratings of Truman and Johnson by over
seven per centage points.

The results concluded that the

Korean war had a statistically negative impact on Truman by
eighteen percentage points.
hand,

had no

independent

The Vietnam War, on the other
impact on Johnson's popularity

ratings (Mueller 1970).
Richard A. Brody and Benjamin I. Page studied the impact
of events on presidential popularity during the Johnson and
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Nixon administrations (Wildavsky 1975).
explain presidential popularity was

Their approach to

rather unique.

The

indicator of the rise in presidential popularity was "good
news," and the fall was predicted by "bad news."

More

specifically, good news was considered to be news perceived
as advancing their values.

on the other spectrum, bad news

was when a person perceived the news to impede their values.
To determine good news and bad news, there were both
clear-cut lines and not-so-clear lines.

For good news,

peace, prosperity, victory, and scientific discoveries were
a given.

For bad news it was assumed that unemployment,

inflation, war casualties, and riots were bad.

To determine

the nature of news, Brody and Page used an empirical method
to distinguish good news from bad news.
Brody and Page gathered two time series to test their
theory.
ended

The first time series started in June, 1965, and
in April,

January,

1969,

1968.
through

The
1971.

second
The

time

period covered

percentage

of

the

population at a given time which approved the president's
handling of the job and the Gallup Poll were analyzed.

Brody

and Page found that these approval ratings occurred thirtyf i ve times for Johnson and thirty-four times for Nixon.
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They

analyzed the data by tracking the changes in approval, and
found that for Johnson the trend of popularity was down.
From the beginning of his time series to the end, Johnson's
popularity gradually went from seventy percent to thirty-six
percent.

Nixon's popularity was similar to a roller coaster.

He started with a

rating of sixty percent in 1969,

and

dropped to fifty percent in 1971, but climbed up to sixty
percent once again before dropping to twenty-four percent in
1972 .
The independent variable was the balance of negative and
positive news between two successive Gallup poll dates.

News

stories were the most important story in each day's news;
they were classified into domestic,
Vietnam.

general foreign,

and

Then the news stories on the results of policy

performance were coded as "good," "bad," or "ambiguous."
results seemed to be statistically significant.
was confirmed in both administrations.
of news discrepancy correlated

.so

The

The theory

The single variable

with opinion change in the

Johnson administration and .28 in Nixon's administration.
The theory accounted for eighty-four percent of the variation
in the level of the presidential popularity for Johnson and
fifty-five percent for Nixon.
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Brody and Page stated that

"the presidential popularity can be accounted for by the
inertial effect of past opinions and the quality of news
between polls." (Wildavsky 1975)
James

A.

Stimson

reported

in

support for American Presidents:

his

article,

"Public

A Cyclical Model,"

the

ability to predict presidential popularity with a parabola
model

(Stimson

1976) .

Using the data derived

from the

popular Gallup question, "Do you approve or disapprove of the
way

(the

President,"

incumbent

President]

is

handling

his

job

as

Stimson explained that the consistency of the

question and the small random error of each data point were
the reasons for using the Gallup Poll.

Stimson used the

measure of "relative approval" (the percent approving as a
proportion of all those expressing an opinion).

Stimson

preferred the reactive approval over the simple approval
because of the abundance of "no opinion" given in earlier
surveys.
Stimson utilized a parabola,

concave upward,

with a

focus in the latter half of the presidential term to model
the popularity of the president.

The model theorized that

the president's popularity would peak when he first took
off ice and then would gradually decline over time and bottom
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out during the last half of the four year term.

After the

period of bottoming out, the approval rating would slightly
increase, but not to its original level.
To fit data on the parabola model, some criteria must be
met.

One criterion was the ability to predict the individual

data points.

The second criteria must be that not only

should the data points be predicted, but that the prediction
should be significantly better than predictions using a
linear model.

Stimpson arranged the computed approval scores

for the seven terms

(Truman to Nixon) •

All points were

gathered along the same zero to four-year time scale. Time
was

ordered

as

presidential

years.

Stimson

uniquely

determined the coefficients, and the parabola predicted all
the Gallup approval readings for five Presidents and seven
terms. The correlation was one-half percent.
correlation,
concluded

Stimson

that

the

met

the

parabola

above
model

With this high

criteria.
was

an

Stimson
effective

representation of Presidential popularity (Stimson 1976).
Henry
on

c. Kenski tested the impact of economic conditions

presidential

popularity.

The

study

analyzed

the

presidential popularity from Eisenhower to Nixon's second

16

term.

Truman was dropped due to underepresentation of data

points and defects in sampling.
Kenski's report noted that Mueller used unemployment as
an indicator of the state of the economy.

Also, he noted

Hibbs contended that Mueller's indicator of the economy was
not statistically significant.

Mueller had suggested using

other variables in addition to unemployment; so and Kenski
applied

Mueller's

advice,

indicators of

inflation

Also,

changed

Kenski

using

unemployment

(general price and food

the

measurement

of

the

and

two

price).
economic

variables which were monthly data and used six-month moving
averages.
Kenski assessed the economic indicators to presidential
popularity

by

regression.
errors ,

using
The

an

analytic

regression

technique

coefficients,

of

multiple

the

standard

and the r-scores were also examined.

The

last

technique employed was the t-test to determine the confidence
limits for the regression coefficients at the ninety-five
percent confidence level.
Inflation
unemployment.

appeared

to

be

more

sensitive

than

The impact of the monthly rate and six-month

moving average of unemployment proved not to be statistically
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significant.

The signs of the coefficients were positive.

However, when the presidents' administrations were separated,
the

popularity

of

the

Republican

presidents

adversely affected by the rate of unemployment.

could

be

On the other

hand, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were positive.
Kenski argued that it would be foolish to impute a causal
linkage, but instead concluded that the Democratic presidents
were able to record their highest popularity ratings despite
high unemployment.

The results of the impact of inflation on

presidential popularity had an association, but Kenski felt
that the statistically significant findings were tainted by
serial

correlation.

Kenski

suggested

that

the

serial

correlation problem should rank high on the agenda to be
solved.

Another concern was his use of the bivariate theory.

Kenski proposed the development of a
regarding

the

impact

of

the

multivariate theory

economic

conditions

on

presidential popularity (Kenski 1977).
Samuel Kernell took the marginal strategy approach to
assess

public opinion

(Kernell

1978).

In the marginal

strategy approach there were two predictions of presidential
popularity and economic performance.
stated that Democrats'

The first prediction

support of the president will be
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associated

closely

with

support with inflation.
the

president

identifiers.

can

were

Kernell

variables

in

not

and

Republicans'

The second prediction stated that

gain

Eisenhower to Reagan's
results

unemployment,

new

support

tested
first

biased,

addition

these

term.

Kernell

to

the

among

opposition

predictions

from

To assure that the
identified
economy's

exogenous

effects

on

presidential popularity.
Inflation failed to produce a negative sign during the
Kennedy and Reagan administration; therefore, this part of
the analysis was omitted.

Unemployment for the Democrats

under Carter showed a positive sign, an inverse relationship
between the economic indicator and the president's approval
rating.
Overall, Kernell found that there were differences in
the relative strengths of the relationship across partisan
groups; however, Johnson's and Nixon's partisan relationship
were consistent with the prediction made by the Gallup Poll
Surveys.

The Gallop Poll Survey predicted that, whatever a

person's political affiliation, they will judge the economy
on the basis of its general conditions.
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Kernell did find some support for the marginal strategy
approach to assess presidential popularity. For Eisenhower's
popularity,

neither unemployment nor inflation had much

impact, but the relationships were stronger for opposition
identifiers than presidential partisans (Kernell 1986).
Kristen R. Monroe tested the economic influences on
presidential popularity (Monroe 1978). In 1976, James Stimson
said that, in the long term, the president's popularity was
unaffected by economic conditions.

Monroe took the same time

frame as Stimson {1950-1974) and, with more sophisticated
equipment, found a strong relationship between the ratings of
presidents and the economic conditions.

She theorized that

the influence from the economy needed a lag model in which
economic influence may be both immediate and cumulative.

The

lag model would allow for a time lag before people experience
the impact of economic events and an extended time period
during which people react to economic changes.
In Monroe's data, presidential popularity was measured
by the percentage of respondents who indicated approval of
the president in the monthly Gallup Poll from 1950, through
the end of the Nixon incumbency in 1974.
economy, Monroe used

To represent the

unemployment {U), inflation (I), real
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personal income (RBI), the Standard and Poor Market index
(SM),

and military expenditures

(MILX).

The first three

representatives of the economy were to measure the political
influences from individual economic well-being.

The MILX

variable was to indicate the government's fiscal policies to
stimulate the economy.
Monroe employed a distributed lag model that was used by
Almon in 1965.

This model permitted the effects of the

economy to be distributed over different periods.

The Almon

model allowed for situations in which the political impact of
economic condition may be noted slowly and felt a long time
after it occurred.

For example, an increased inflation in

the spring could still have an impact into the fall.
using

the Almon

equation,

dummy variables

control the cyclical fluctuations.

When

were used

to

Also, manipulations were

effective in eliminating the trends of the variables in the
use of the time series.
Monroe

concluded

expenditures were
presidential

that

consistently

popularity.

inf lat ion
significant

However,

and

military

influences

unemployment,

on

real

personal income, and the stock market were not significant
influences on popularity.

The cumulative sum of the statis-

21

tical significance suggested that, if inflation increased one
percent, the effect was a decrease of almost four percentage
points in popularity; therefore, the overall pattern of the
data showed that inflation was a significant negative influence on presidential popularity and can have an impact which
stays politically important and significant up to one year
after the occurrence.

The military expenditures, too, were

significant and politically

important,

but the positive

effect was present from thirteen to twenty-three months after
the expenditure, but not any time before (Monroe 1978).
George Edwards conducted a study to test for the effects
of economy, war, issue differences with the president, and
rally events on the president's approval (Edwards 1985).
statistics used were tau-b and Somer's

o.

The

Edwards noted that

lack of uniformity appears to be a problem with data
consistency across studies.

The surveys he analyzed did not

specifically ask the same question from time to time.
the types of questions varied in degree.

Also,

Edwards noted that

the economy definitely has an influence on Americans.

Some

political scientists believe the economy is the basis for
approval or disapproval of the president.

However, recently

some scholars argued that the public evaluates the success of
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the president on grounds other than economics.

"In other

words, rather than asking what the president has done for
them lately, citizens ask what the president has done for the
nation (Edwards 1985)."
In the surveys regarding a person,s economic perspective, the two questions asked were "Would you say that you
(and your family living here) are better off or worse off
financially than you were a year ago?" and "Do you think that
a year from now you (and your family living here) will be
better off financially or worse off, or just about the same
as now?"

The questions were cross-tabulated with presiden-

tial approval ratings.

From 1968 to 1980, this relationship

between popularity ratings and financial status accounted for
fifty-two percent of those polled.

The approval or

disapproval ratings of the president is directly related to
whether or not the financial status of those polled had gone
up or done.
Unemployment statistics cross-tabulated with presidential approval resulted in a weak correlation.

The unemploy-

ment of a respondent or of the head of family would seem to
cause respondents to evaluate the president's performance
negatively.

Edwards believed that people who were unemployed
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would be more likely to blame the president if they felt
unemployment was a solvable problem.
statistically

weak

correlation

of

Democrats and no correlation for

The result showed a
-.11

only

among

the

any other respondents.

Also, when the control was that the federal government was
responsible

for

providing everyone with a

good

job

and

standard of living, there was no statistically significant
relationship.
personal

Edwards

overall

experience with

findings

concluded

unemployment does

not

that

strongly

correlate with the popularity of the president.
Since

inflation

affects

everyone

in

the

country,

Edwards assumed inflation would have a widespread effect on
the president's popularity.
president

on

economic

If people were to evaluate the

condition,

reflect the president's approval.

then

inflation

should

Edwards' analysis of the

personal impact of inflation on respondents was based on 1980
data.

The data proved not to be statistically significant at

-.08 for the Democrats, Independents, and Republicans.
Then Edwards proceeded to ask respondents their view of
the presidents performance on economic policy.
significance ranged form -.29 to

-.so.

The

Edwards found that

this evaluation was not more statistically significant than
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the evaluation of inflation.

He attributed this to the logic

that "the public evaluates the president more on the basis of
how it thinks the economy itself is performing."
1985)

(Edwards

Edwards concluded that economic factors do affect the

presidency but not to a great extent.
substantial

difference

in

public's evaluation of the

the

However, he found a

relationship

between

the

president on economic policy and

the public's personal economic condition.
When Edwards analyzed war and the president's approval,
he only evaluated the effect of the Vietnam War.

The 1968

survey asked respondents if a close friend or family member
served

in Vietnam.

Edwards

assumed that,

if

a

person

evaluated the president on the impact of the war, it would be
revealed here. He admitted that his assumption was wrong, for
in no incident did this happen.
In the three surveys

(1968,

1970, 1972), respondents

were asked to rate on a scale what they felt was the right
policy for Vietnam.

The scale ranged from withdraw to

completing a military victory.

Then the respondents were

asked to place the president on the same scale.

To determine

the president's approval on the war issue, Edwards computed
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the differences with the president on Vietnam.

The statis-

tics proved to be significant at -.01.
In summary, the findings were similar to those for the
economy.

The respondents evaluated the president in terms of

their perception of the president's performance.

Personal

experience with the war in Vietnam proved to be almost
irrelevant.
Edwards conducted seven surveys to measure the impact of
issues and policy on the president's popularity.

Respon-

dents were asked to place both themselves and the president
on a scale for each of a variety of issues.

Then Edwards

computed the results by adding the absolute differences
between the respondents and the president on each issue.
Almost all of the data proved to be statistically significant
and varied in terms of strength.
A rally event, as defined by John Mueller, was international,

directly involves the U.S.

president.
focused.
public.

and particularly the

A rally event is specific, dramatic, and sharply
This included events that were prominent to the

The rally event theory assumes that the people will

increase their support for the president in times of crisis
because "America is at stake."
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In the Edward's study, all rally events were considered
equal.

An increase of ten percentage points in the polls was

the baseline for an impact by a rally event.
were taken in identifying a rally event.

Two approaches

The first approach

looked at sudden jumps in presidential approval to see if
they followed a rally event.

The second approach examined

all qualifying rally events to see if they preceded a surge
in presidential approval.
Sudden jumps occurred in the polls twenty-one times.
Not even half of the surges were preceded by a rally event.
Edwards said it was difficult to determine the effect.
rally event proved to be hard to isolate.

The

In conclusion,

there seemed to be no difference between the rally event
surges and the non rally event surges.
Edwards concluded that presidential approval ratings
were due to how the public evaluated the handling of policies.

Policy efforts and issue stands play a more important

role than unemployment , the cost of living and war casualties. Therefore, the public expected the presidents to handle
issues successfully (Edwards 1983).

Methods and Procedure
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Using the Gallup Poll seemed to be the best choice for
popularity ratings.

The Gallup Poll's constant regularity

over the past

decades,

four

using the question

"Do you

approve or disapprove of the way (the incumbent) is handling
his job as President?", has provided a basis for a presidential popularity index.

Over time, this index is one of the

longest, continuous line of questioning in polling history.
This study divides the line for the period of the beginning
of

the Truman administration to the end

of the Johnson

administration as time period "A," and the beginning of the
Nixon administration to the end of the Bush administration as
time period "B."

The time periods are tested to see whether

or not that time period "A" can be predicted by a linear
decline model better than time period "B."
The data was incorporated into a data file.

The data

file included the date of the popularity rating, the approval
rating, and a dummy variable.

Most of the polling was taken

once per month; however, in the instance that there were more
than one per month,

the first polling of each month was

included and the last polling of the month was discarded.
The dummy variable was set as a constant.
the point slope formula used:
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The following is

predicted population

= intercept

BO + Bl(dummy variable)

To attain Bl and BO of the point slope formula the approval
rating was regressed against the dummy variable for each term
not including the last year of each term.

The remaining

dummy variables were then added into the formula for the last
year of the president's term.

In the case of a president

serving more than one term the data started over as
ignoring the previous term.

if

This approach tried to predict

popularity ratings for the last last year of each term.

Each

predicted approval data point was then compared to the actual
rating done by the Gallup Poll by taking the difference
between the projected popularity and the real popularity.
When taking the difference, each difference was turned into
a

positive.

For example,

if a

predicted popularity was

thirty-five percent and the real popularity was twenty-five
percent the difference would be negative ten.

The number was

then given a positive sign because the predicted popularity
varies; therefore, the average of the difference would appear
much smaller.

Then an average was taken for each term to

compare the accuracy of the linear model {See Appendix K).
Last,

a

regression

line

was
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used

because

which

"best

summarizes the distribution of data points on a scatter
diagram and the slope of which characterizes the relationship
in units of change between two intervals." (Manheim and Rich
1991)

Results

All president's approval ratings have unique and similar
qualities.

I will evaluate president's approval ratings in

two ways.

First, I will evaluate each president for the

variance of their approval ratings, their approval ratings in
relation to winning or losing reelection, the ability to
predict their approval rating and the accuracy of the linear
model compared to the curvilinear model.

Second, I will

evaluate their ratings by comparing time period A to time
period B.

Areas to analyze will include the accuracy of the

linear model and the patterns of the president's approval
rating.
Due to infrequent polls and erratic polling intervals
that were not set,
analysis.

Truman has been discarded

from the

After predicting for Truman's last year which

consisted of five points, the average error in predicting was
close to twenty percent.

The polls simply were not taken
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frequently enough.

There were a total of twenty-one polls

taken over a four year time period.
model

must

have

consistency

in

The linear regression

polling

for

projection

purposes.
Eisenhower's first term

During Eisenhower's first term, the Gallup Poll surveyed
the public twenty-seven times (See Appendix A).

Only four

polls were taken the last year of his first term; therefore,
four approval ratings were predicted for him.

The variance

of Eisenhower's approval ratings for his first three years
ranged from fifty-seven percent to seventy-nine percent.

The

fact his approval rating was always more than fifty percent
during his first term helps explain his re-election to a
second term.
When

predicting

Eisenhower's

approval

ratings,

the

difference between the projected popularity and the real
popularity ranged from a high of six and a half points and a
low of one.

The average difference between the projected and

the actual popularity was close to three points.

Compared to

the other presidents, Eisenhower's predicted popularity fared
rather well.

The success of the predicted approval rating

could have been due to the fact that each of his last four
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approval

rating points

from

one

polling to

another

did

actually regress.

Eisenhower's second term

Eisenhower's second term did not predict as well as his
first term (See Appendix B).

Twenty-seven polls were taken

over the four years of his second term.

Again Eisenhower

kept his approval ratings above fifty percent; the highest
rating was seventy-nine percent, and the lowest was fifty-two
percent.
the

During his fourth year, seven polls were taken, and

difference

between

the

actual

and

the

predicted

popularity ranged from a high twelve and a half and a low of
one.

There were three points when his ratings did not follow

a decline in his polls.

One of these points was at the end

of his term when a new president was already elected and the
public

was

being

kinder

to

Eisenhower.

The

average

difference between projected and actual popularity was six,
and the predictions underestimated the Gallup Poll approval
ratings.

Kennedy
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Although Kennedy's term was unfortunately cut short,
there were enough data to include him in the analysis (See
Appendix C).

There were twenty-one polls taken in a three

year period and the

last eight pollings were predicted.

During the first two years of his term, the highest approval
rating stood at seventy-nine percent, and the lowest dropped
to sixty-six percent.

The last approval rating taken during

his third year reached a low of fifty-nine percent.
The

difference

between

the

estimated

and

the

real

popularity ranged from a high of nine and a low of four;
whereas, the average was six compared to an average of twelve
during his first year.

The range of his actual approval

ratings was between sixty-six percent to fifty-nine percent.
All but two of Kennedy's approval ratings declined.

The

predicted approval rates tended to overestimate Kennedy's
approval ratings.

Johnson

The analysis of Johnson begins at his election in 1964.
During his time in office,

the thirty-three polls taken

showed a wide range of approval (See Appendix D).

He peaked

at seventy percent and hit bottom at thirty five percent.
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In

September of 1966, his approval rating dropped below fifty
percent and never recovered.
Johnson's last year had more of a curvilinear look than
a linear.

The ability to predict his approval ratings had an

average difference of eight.

The difference between the

expected and the actual popularity ranged from a low of less
than one to a high of eighteen.

If the last approval point

of Johnson was thrown out, assuming the jump in his last
approval rating was given out of generosity of ending his
term,

then the average difference would improve to seven

points.

The predicted approval rates tended to underestimate

the approval ratings.

Nixon's first term
During Eisenhower's term twenty-seven polls were taken;
whereas,

in

pollings.
percent

Nixon's

first

term

there

were

forty-four

Nixon's popularity fluctuated from forty-eight
to

sixty-eight

percent

(See

Appendix

E).

The

predicted approval ratings tended to underestimate Nixon's
actual approval ratings.

The difference of the expected and

the real popularity ratings ranged from a low of one to a
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high of fourteen and a half points; whereas,

the average

difference was close to ten points.
The approval ratings for Nixon would probably be better
predicted using a curvilinear model.

Nixon's lowest approval

ratings occurred toward the second half of his third year and
than moved from forty-eight percent to sixty-two percent
within a year and a half.

One reason for the increase of

approval ratings in his fourth year could have been his
successful

campaign

to

rebuild

public

support

for

his

upcoming election.

Nixon's second term
Nixon's second term consisted of eighteen polls over a
two year period, and there was an attempt to predict the last
six points (See Appendix F).
at

fifty-one

percent.

The ratings started rather low

percent and ended even lower at twenty-six

The highest approval rating was sixty-five percent

which occurred

in the middle of fifty-one percent approval

and fifty-nine percent approval.

For the most part the

ratings were extremely low, dwindling to twenty-two percent.
The rapid decline of his approval rating was caused by
the Watergate scandal.

The fluctuation of the approval
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rating varied

forty-three

percent over two years,

which

probably substantiates the fact that the predicted approval
rating was highly underestimating Nixon's approval rating.
Nixon's second term regressed, but the rate of regression was
too quick for the linear model to be accurate.

The last

predicted approval rating for Nixon predicted an approval
rating of forty-six points, which was a difference of twenty
points from the actual approval rating.
rating had a difference of five points.

The first approval
The average approval

rating between the real and the estimated approval rating was
twelve.

Ford

Ford's variance of approval ratings for all twenty-four
polls taken ranged from thirty-seven percent to seventy-one
percent

(See Appendix G).

The average difference of the

actual approval and the estimated approval rating was nine.
The predicted approval ratings underestimated the actual
approval ratings.

Ford's popularity steadily declined the

last year of his term; however, the last rating taken in
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December 1976, was rather high. If it were to be eliminated,
the average would improve to eight points.

This would

represent a more accurate picture of Ford's linear decline of
his approval rating.

These low approval ratings, which were

almost all below fifty-percent, could reflect the incident of
not being re-elected.

carter
Forty-six
Carter.

polls

assessed

the

approval

ratings

for

The approval ratings fluctuated from twenty-nine

percent to seventy percent (See Appendix H).

For the most

part, the last year represented a linear decline, but the
starting point for the predicted approval rating was so low
that the difference between the real approval rating and the
projected approval

rating was nearly twenty-six points.

Overall, the predicted approval ratings were underestimating
the Gallup Poll approval ratings.

The difference between the

predicted approval rating and the real approval rating ranged
from eight to twenty-six, and the average was fifteen.

Like

Ford, Carter's struggled during his last year in office to
maintain approval ratings above fifty-percent.

Also like

Ford, Carter lost this bid for re-election for a second term.
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Reaqan's first term

During Reagan's first term, the Gallup Poll administered
the presidential approval poll forty-seven times, and eleven
of the last approval ratings were attempted predictions (See
Appendix I).

Reagan's approval ratings varied from thirty-

one percent to sixty-eight percent.

The predicted approval

ratings tended to underestimate Reagan's last year.

In fact

the relation of the predicted approval rating to the actual
approval ratings were inversely proportioned.

The lowest

difference between the real and predicted popularity was the
first prediction which differed by twelve,

and the point

difference between the prediction and the real
ratings
Therefore,

increased
the

last

for

each

predicted

consecutive
approval

highest; it differed by twenty-six.

approval

prediction.

rating

was

the

The average difference

between predicted approval ratings and the approval ratings
was eighteen.

Reagan's approval ratings progressed during

the last year of his first term, which could have been caused
by his attempt to regain support for his re-election.

Reaqan's second term
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Reagan's second term was more successful in terms of
higher approval ratings.

Only nine approval ratings out of

thirty-nine pollings were below fifty-percent.

The average

difference between the predicted and the estimated popularity
was two and a half points (See Appendix J).
seems

the

predicted

approval

ratings

would

Reagan's last year followed linear regression.
raw

approval

exemplify a

ratings

if

plotted

on

a

This success
assume

that

However, the

graph

would

not

linear regression nor curvilinear regression.

The graph of points would look more like a yo-yo which goes
up and down for no apparent reason.

The approval ratings

never varied more than five points,

so even the greatest

difference did not exceed five points.

Bush

During Bush's administration, the Gallup Poll surveyed
his popularity forty-seven times.

During the first three

years of his administration, Bush kept his approval ratings
above fifty percent and peaked at an overwhelming eighty-nine
percent.

Despite the fact that he was given the highest

approval rating of all the Presidents from Truman to Reagan,
he failed to get re-elected.
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Bush's approval rating his last year regressed straight
downward, but the whole term did not (See Appendix K).

The

last year of approval ratings saw the fall of his ratings
after the peak of the curve.

The predicted approval ratings

highly overestimated Bush's actual approval ratings.

The

predicted approval ratings for Bush's last year in office
ironically progressed as the Gallup Poll's approval ratings
regressed.

Bush was the only president in this study to

possess a progressive predicted approval rating; therefore,
his average difference between real and predicted popularity
was thirty-three which was higher than any other President.
The progression of the predicted approval rating happened
because the

first three years of Bush's term progressed

rather than regressed.

Also, the trend during Bush's term to

receive continually higher approval ratings halted near the
end of his third year .

So the predicted approval ratings

predicted progressive ratings, whereas Bush's actual ratings
exemplified the linear model.

Time period A and B

Time
elements.

periods

A

and

B

contained

some

interesting

To analyze the results of the study, a comparison
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must be made between time period A and B.

The data for each

time period possess some patterns, and the predicted approval
ratings vary for each time period.

Another important element

was whether or not each time period followed the linear
model.
The first comparison made was the approval ratings.
time period A,

In

the approval ratings stayed above fifty

percent except for Johnson, whereas in time period B, not one
president's approval ratings stayed above fifty percent.

For

time period A, the difference between the highest and lowest
approval ratings hovered in the twenties, and for time period
B, the difference was in the thirties and forties.

The

approval ratings in time period A remained between fifty and
seventy percent most of the time.

However, in time period B,

ratings dropped to the twentieth percentile and reached as
high as the upper eighties.

The highest and lowest approval

ratings for presidents since the 1950's can be seen in time
period B.

This truly supports one premise of the thesis that

public opinion was more volatile in the post-Nixon era.
The second comparison was the success of the predicted
approval ratings {See Appendix K).
total

average

difference

between
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For time period A, the
real

and

estimated

popularity of each president was six points, and for time
period B, the average was eleven and a half points.

Time

period A could be better predicted by using the linear model,
but there was no continuity in predicting the points.
The least average difference between the actual and the
predicted popularity rating, Reagan's second term, was in
time period B, the time period which had a greater average
difference between the actual and the estimated popularity.
The second lowest average difference was for Eisenhower's
first term (See Appendix L).

For Eisenhower's second term,

Johnson, Nixon's both terms, Carter, and Reagan's first term,
the predicted approval ratings tended to underestimate the
actual

approval

ratings.

The

only

times

the

predicted

popularity ratings overestimated were for Bush and Kennedy.
When

the

predicted

approval

ratings

overestimated

underestimated, the difference was clearly seen.
Eisenhower's
popularity

first

rating

term
jumped

and
over

Reagan's
and

second

under

the

or

However for
term

the

predicted

popularity rating.
All of the president's predicted popularity declined
except for Bush.

Bush was a-typical because his popularity

ratings were so high, the predicted population had a positive
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point slope.

The presidents last year did decline,

the

regression did not reflect the success of the predicted
approval ratings.

If the starting point

for

the

first

predicted approval rating was equal to the first actual
approval rating and continue to use the rate of decline, then
the predicted approval ratings would be more favorable.

conclusion
As predicted in the hypothesis, time period A can be
predicted better than time period B when using a

linear

model.

it

The

problem

lies

statistically significant.

in

whether

or

not

is

To be statistically significant,

time period A and time period B must possess a distinct
difference in the success or failure of the linear model
predictions.
Three reasons can be given for not relying heavily on
this hypothesis.

One is that, although there are differences

in the variance of the approval ratings, the approval ratings
for Presidents within a

particular time period were not

always similar to each other.

Second,

the linear model

worked better for time period A, but that could be due to the
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lack of polling during the last six months of off ice when
most candidates regain more support.
be

due

to

different.

the

fact

that

the

The differences could

periods

of

polling

were

To improve this, rather than predict the last

year, the prediction should be only for the first six months
of

the

President's

last

year.

Thirdly,

the

predicted

approval ratings and the real ratings average difference only
varied six between time period A and B, but what value should
be considered a poor or good prediction was not determined.
The hypothesis heads in the right direction; the idea should
not be totally discarded because of the problems mentioned
above, but more research and analysis should be done on the
validity of the linear model to predict Presidential approval
ratings.
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Nixon's First Term
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Nixon's Second Term
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Reagan's First Term
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Reagan's Second Term
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Appendix L
President

Average difference between
and actual popularity

Time period A
Eisenhower (1st term)
Eisenhower (2nd term)
Kennedy
Johnson

2.72
6

6.5
8.65

Time period B
Nixon (1st term)
Nixon (2nd term)
Ford
Carter
Reagan (1st term)
Reagan (2nd term)
Bush

9.64

12.29
9.3
14.83
17.93
2.55
16.46

projected
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